The fatal-conflict model has many fewer dogmatic proponents than casual propagators, but although vaguely defined it has identifiable premises:
1. Each country is fated to regard the other as its main foreign nemesis, whether because of racially inspired animosity, misunderstandings stemming from their cultural differences, or the need to carve out living room for its growing population.
2. The two nations are engaged in a total conflict in at least three ways: First, the conflict involves people at all status levels, from the political leadership and the commercial elite down to the peasants and urban lumpenproletariat. In other words, "nations" means not just the Haitian and Dominican states but their people. Second, instances of cooperation or mutual understanding between Haitians and Dominicans are rare and perhaps nonexistent.1 Third, what is at stake is control of the island of Hispaniola, with "control" being defined in such a way as to permit all attempts at domination or instances of struggle between Haitians and Dominicans to serve as evidence.
3. To the degree that the conflict involves people of all social statuses and is waged for domination at the highest possible level, the survival of the two nations as cultural entities ultimately hangs in the balance. The conflict is "fatal," then, because it is not only predestined but a fight to the death. Far be it from me to suggest that there are no fundamental conflicts between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. There is no way to paint a happy face over the grave problems that divide the two countries. On the Dominican side, for example, openly racist expressions of hostility toward Haitians abound. Haitian immigrants have been victimized and denied basic rights, including due process in deportation proceedings and citizenship even for those born in the Dominican Republic (Human Rights Watch, 2002) . No number of counterexamples of acceptance and influence of Haitian cultural practices in the Dominican Republic can negate the fact that there is strong opposition to Haitian immigration among some sectors of Dominican society.2 Perhaps even more important, people of both nationalities but especially many Dominicans believe themselves to be utterly different from and incompatible with their neighbors from across the island. Acceptance of this idea generates unwarranted pessimism and provides leaders on either side of the island with a ready-made rationale for not trying harder to improve relations with their island neighbors. The fatal-conflict model also has important negative consequences for the Dominican Republic's standing in the world. The allegation that Dominicans are implacably hostile to all things Haitian is tarnishing the Dominican Republic's image in international relations, particularly when it is linked to explosive allegations that Haitian migrant workers are enslaved on Dominican sugar plantations.3
While it is undeniable that anti-Haitian feeling and ideology are a central part of Dominican nationalism, insufficient research has been given to why and when anti-haitianismo became so important. I cannot pretend to answer these questions but sooner consider my task here to be clearing away old misconceptions and half-truths that through uncritical repetition have come to be taken as fact. I aim to show that viewing the Dominican-Haitian relationship as a fatal conflict has little foundation in what scholars know about the historical composition and the present-day beliefs, values, and ways of life of people on either side of the border.
Concerning the historical origins of anti-haitianismo, it can be said with certainty that the regime of the Dominican dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo (1930 to 1961) aggressively propagated anti-Haitian ideology through a variety of means, including the schools, broadcast and print media, national commemorations and holidays, and participation in the all-powerful ruling party. Although anti-Haitian feeling may not be the creation of elite discourse and certainly predated Trujillo, it surely owes its prominence in Dominican culture and politics largely to government propaganda during and after the Trujillo regime. At the same time, Trujillo and his successors not only permitted the recruitment of braceros from Haiti but brought this recruitment and the sugar industry that it served under progressively greater government control (Martinez, 1999) . Official policy toward Haiti has thus been doubleedged. Anti-Haitian propaganda puts forward the Haitian immigrant as a scapegoat for problems in the Dominican political economy while statesponsored immigration from Haiti has created a mass of malleable nonunion labor.4
It also bears noting from the outset that the fatal-conflict model approximates Dominican perspectives more fully than it reflects Haitian perspectives. It is little exaggeration to say that for most Haitians the Dominican Republic might as well be on the other side of the planet or is at most that sugar-plantation netherworld that swallows up the most desperate of Haiti's emigrants.5 Few in Haiti, elite or working-class, perceive their country to be engaged in a struggle for supremacy with the Dominican Republic or with any other nation. Most instead see their country engaged in a struggle for survival in which the Dominican Republic plays only a minor, if largely antagonistic, part. Contrary to the fatal-conflict model, most Haitians probably underestimate the importance of the Dominican Republic to their country generally and have little accurate knowledge of its place in the survival strategies of the hundreds of thousands of their compatriots who live across the border. Surely, the Dominican Republic has low visibility in part because those Haitians who go to the Dominican Republic are drawn from the poorest and least vocal segments of society. But whatever the reasons, the Dominican obsession with Haiti is an unrequited passion: Haitians do not regard Dominicans with anything like the same feeling as that of Dominicans looking upon Haitians.6
These observations alone call into doubt that the conflict between the two countries stems primarily from ancient or quasi-instinctive animosities and raise questions about who the main parties are and what interests are in play. It would be inaccurate to say that the conflict involves the totality of the two nations or even matches two parties of equal strength. Instead, the conflict is at base about immigration from Haiti, and the main parties to it are the large mass of immigrants and their advocates, Dominican and international, versus the political power holders who have an interest in making an issue out of "uncontrolled" immigration and the economic power holders who wish to secure cheaper, more easily disciplined labor from Haiti. The fatal-conflict model distracts us from these issues through its exaggerated emphasis on past instances of conflict and cultural differences between the two countries.
I approach these issues as a cultural anthropologist with more than three years of accumulated fieldwork in Haitian migrant communities on both sides of the island. The more I study the Dominican-Haitian relationship, the more I become aware of how many unanswered questions surround it, especially concerning Dominicans' varied attitudes toward Haiti, Haitians, and blackness. One thing that does emerge clearly from my fieldwork is that the people of the two nations do not confront each other in unmitigated enmity but are bound together in a more complex weave of mutual fascination and repulsion, attraction and dislike, respect and fear. This does not mean that the tensions between Haiti and the Dominican Republic have easy answers. It does call for more careful study of just where the conflicts lie.
Most of my essay is given over to questioning of the historical and cultural premises of the fatal-conflict model. Cultural exchanges between the eastern and western sides began even before the Haitian Revolution brought an end to slavery on the island and only accelerated with the independence of each nation from European rule (Baud, 1996:142) . Examining the history of their relationship and comparing elements of the two nations' cultures, I conclude that the fatal-conflict model has been and can be sustained only by ignoring mountains of evidence of past and present understanding and collaboration between the two countries' people, who share so much culturally that their beliefs, values, and ways of life ought to be-and I suspect often are-a basis for mutual trust and understanding rather than a source of suspicion and fear. Through this path, I hope also to identify some of the real points of conflict and sketch an alternative understanding of the Haitian-Dominican relationship.
HISTORY
The idea that "the problem" between the two countries began with Haiti's early-nineteenth-century attempts at political domination over the entire island has wide currency in the Dominican Republic. On their way in to Santo Domingo from the Aeropuerto Interacional Las Americas, the video crew of the PBS documentary series Americas filmed its cab driver offering the following-apparently spontaneous-explanation for the existence of antiblack prejudice among Dominicans: "We deny that we are mulatto. Blacks are marginalized and treated badly in this country. There is a complete denial of blackness in this country. All this hatred of black people began in 1822, when the Haitians invaded the Dominican Republic. They wanted to take over the country. This hatred started to grow in our national consciousness, because they wanted to trample us" (WGBH, 1993) . For words like these to be spoken by a cab driver seems to give strong support to James Ferguson's (1992: 15) Even as Pefia's travails are gone over again and again in popular and academic treatments of racism Dominican-style, it is never pondered how Pefia came within a hair's breadth of winning the presidency in 1994 and 1996 in spite of the virulent hate campaign waged against him. Who are these nearly 50 percent of Dominicans who were so unperturbed by Pefia's blackness and presumed Haitian ancestry that they voted to place the country's highest political office in his hands? I know of only one scholar (Torres-Saillant, 1998: 133) who has paused to ask the obvious question: considering that a near majority of Dominican voters chose el haitiano (the term by which Peiia was widely referred to on the streets of Santo Domingo) to be their president, does anti-Haitianism really have so powerful a hold on Dominican imaginations as most observers seem to think?9 In most accounts, Pefia's plight is evidence of a feeling of repugnance for Haiti and Haitians so strong that the mere labeling of someone or something as "Haitian" is enough to send all Dominicans scurrying. Clearly, the reality is more complex, and a balanced account may be possible only once the sources of Pefia's support, including the virtual cult of personality that his supporters built up around him and preserve even after his death, are given just as serious study as the terrible racism and xenophobia that he endured in life.10 It is nonetheless troubling that reporters, columnists, political cartoonists, and other opinion makers joined in the Haitianbashing, with no apparent misgivings about how their racism and xenophobia might be coarsening the Dominican democratic process. Yet there is reason to doubt that the majority of Dominicans accorded much respect to these media racists and Haitianophobes. While it cannot be doubted that there were many people for whom Pefia's Haitianness and blackness were a major concern, they probably do not amount to more than the 20 percent or more of Dominican voters who made up Pefia's hard-core base of electoral support (Howard, Such popular celebrations of blackness suggest that scholars stand to gain by more closely studying the subjective formulations of identity of those Dominicans who have dark skin and stand low in the social hierarchy. Only thus may we achieve an understanding of the social construction of race that is less one-sided and monolithic than the often repeated observation that Dominicans consider themselves not black but rather one or another shade of brown (Charles, 1992 The ironic truth may be that people at the bottom of the social ladder surmount the linguistic barrier with much greater ease than their countries' highly educated elites. Loanwords, with which each country's language is dotted, attest that understanding across the linguistic boundary is not only possible but fairly frequent. Were the loanwords in each language to be systematically collected, classified, and situated in their historical and social contexts, an as-yet untold history of peaceful contact, cross-cultural exchange, and overlapping experiences between the Haitian and the Dominican people might be unearthed.
Religion must surely be one of the leading domains of lexical borrowing, at least on the Dominican side of the border (Torres-Saillant, 1998: 132). For Hispanophilic and Haitianophobic thinkers among the Dominican bourgeoisie, the devout adherence of Dominicans to Roman Catholicism and the passionate devotion of Haitians to vodiu are like oil and water: they cannot mix (Saez, 1988 Beyond loanwords/practices, the peasant heritage has furnished both peoples with a rich set of metaphors for evaluating and coping with the uprooting of the peasantry and its migration to the cities. Similar gendered agrarian metaphors on the two sides of the border express the dissatisfaction of subalterns with the price exacted of them in economic insecurity by their societies' capitalist, urban-dominated development regimes. When, for example, Antony Santos refers to a beautiful woman's sexuality through the metaphor of a parcel of land in his hit bachata "La parcela," he unconsciously echoes a Haitian aphorism, "Chak fanm fet ak yon kawo t--nan mitan janm-ni" ("Every woman has a carreau of land ... between her legs") (Lowenthal, 1984: 22) . The lyrics of"La parcela" not only employ metaphors that resonate across the Haiti-Dominican Republic border but project values that I think Haiti's peasants and recent rural-urban migrants would readily endorse. In this song, Santos breathlessly admires how beautiful and well-tended his neighbor's parcela (parcel of land) is, and begs her, a pretty morena (dark girl), not to sell it to a developer.15
Bachata has been denounced as misogynist, and it may well be. The lyrics of "La parcela" certainly objectify woman. But astute and well-informed interpreters could have an interpretive field day by reading the competitive and troubled man-woman relations sung about by bachateros as allegories of a larger social malaise. Reflected in its uncertainty that the city woman will continue to exchange her sexual fidelity for her husband's vow of lasting support there is a sense in "La parcela" and uncounted other bachatas that in the city the order of life is not as it should be. Not just nostalgia for the country life but alienation from the city's more highly commercialized human relations is conveyed in Santos's plucky plea that his beautiful neighbor sell her "land" to him, a humble "farmer," rather than putting it out for more lucrative, if sterile and ultimately unsustainable, commercial development. She might get "a million" by placing her sexual assets on the open market, but she will not get the kind of knowing and caring treatment that a good husband can give.
Haitian migrant sugarcane workers tap into a similar vein of protest, veiled as disparagement of women, when they refer to the Dominican Republic as apeyi bouzen ("hookers' country"). I have developed the argument elsewhere that, far from claiming that all Dominican women are prostitutes, these migrants may be expressing the fear of having prostituted themselves in swapping their Haitian livelihoods rooted in independent cultivation of the soil for more lucrative, if riskier, work for wages on the Dominican side of the border (Martinez, 1995: 88):
Haitians look down on the prostitute notjust for being immoral. They condemn her also for exchanging use of her "natural" assets for ephemeral gain rather than trading these for a commitment of lasting support. In like manner, the Haitian bracero knows that, no matter how hard he works, he will gain little or nothing in long-term security by remaining on the sugar estates. Only by returning home to Haiti can he convert his Dominican money into assets of his own. One larger lesson to be drawn from such political manipulation of the Haitian issue is who the parties to the Haitian-Dominican conflict really are and what the struggle is about. There is a struggle taking place on the island of Hispaniola, but that struggle focuses on the specific issue of immigration. What is being struggled for is not the island but control over the immigrant population on one side of it. The assertions of certain right-wing xenophobes aside, Haiti and Haitians are no more contesting Dominicans for control over Hispaniola than Mexico and Mexicans are contesting Americans for control over North America. Nor does the struggle involve two parties of equal strength, much less engage the two nations in their totality against each other. Rather it is a match that pits immigrants, with no defenses but their wits and their large numbers, against the security apparatus of the host state and the politicians and other opinion makers who seek to score points against their political adversaries by raising a scare about uncontrolled immigration. More a game of cat-and-mouse than a cockfight, the struggle is one in which only one party bears deadly weapons and only the survival of the weaker party is at risk. Yet in this game the point is not to eliminate the mouse but to prolong its pursuit indefinitely. Doing away with the mouse would be counterproductive to the cat's larger ends, for a dead mouse would leave the cat with no one to blame for things going wrong in the house and no spectacle of pursuit with which to divert the attention of the residents from the dwindling stocks in the larder.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
The greater part of my essay has been given over to arguing that history and culture are not the main sources of tension between the two countries. While it would be an overstatement to say that Haitians and Dominicans are two "ethnic groups" within a single island society, the two cultures overlap too much and have borrowed too freely from each other's practices and beliefs to be regarded as unambiguously distinct societies. In any event, discussion of the Haitian-Dominican relationship should no longer fail to call attention to the significant cultural overlap and history of continuous exchange across the island. Does this give reason for optimism concerning the prospects for improving relations between the two nations? Not if one considers recent examples of other social groups-Hutus and Tutsis or Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims-who share significantly more culturally than Haitians and Dominicans but even so have killed each other en masse. Yet I think it is still important to be as accurate as we can in specifying what divides the island of Hispaniola into two social entities. Dominicans' anti-Haitian feelings stem more from elite-produced anti-Haitian propaganda, reinforced by the resentment built through decades of labor market competition with cheaper and more easily disciplined immigrant workers, than from fatal incompatibilities of language, race, and culture (Vega, 1993: 31) . Focusing on the cultural distance between the two nations distracts us from the root causes of their conflict.
My second recurrent concern has been how little we truly know about ordinary Dominicans' attitudes toward Haiti and Haitians. Standing in the way of developing a new understanding of racism and national identity in the Dominican Republic is our woefully incomplete knowledge of the dialectic of repulsion and fascination with which Dominicans regard Haitian culture, a dialectic of which anti-Haitianism is just one pole. Much of what is not known could be discovered by going beyond survey data and analysis of elite texts to plunge into the ephemera of the everyday lives and the at times intricately encoded subjective formulations of experience of the Dominican masses. Information concerning all these things is there for the taking, as freely available as the air around us. It is to be found not just in such obvious folkloric Africanisms and Haitianisms as palos drumming and the Lenten gaga festival but in the popular culture that most Dominicans inhabit daily. Yet, like air, this information is evanescent and resistant to being fixed on paper. Scholarly understanding of these issues will remain inadequate so long as evidence of the kind that I have drawn upon only anecdotally here is not more systematically gathered from sources as diverse as bachata lyrics, what supporters shout outside the walls of Joaquin Balaguer's Santo Domingo compound, and the continuing adoration of the late Jose Francisco Pefia G6mez by hundreds of thousands of Partido Revolucionario Dominicano supporters. In the streets, alleyways, work camps, and villages that working-class Dominicans share with Haitians are to be found littlestudied perspectives on the Haitian-Dominican relationship. Prolonged firsthand study in these places would reveal hitherto unsuspected complexities and might yield strongly differing interpretations. Yet I would venture that the more scholars delve into the contradictory lived realities and formulations of experience of the Dominican masses, the less satisfying we will find ideas about Dominican identity derived from elite texts. We may also yet be surprised to find that most working-class Dominicans adapt more easily to the challenges of social change and show greater tolerance of racial and ethnic complexity than do their more affluent compatriots. 14. Already more than half a century ago, James Leyburn (1966: 199 n.6) concluded, "The word 'coumbite' was apparently borrowed from the Spanish part of the island, and from the Spanish word convidar, convey. In Colombia 'convite' means exactly what 'coumbite' means in Haiti: a gathering of peasants to work in common, or else a cooperative society for mutual agricultural self-help." A Spanish colonial origin for the konbit/convite would be in keeping also with historical circumstances. When the ancestors of today's Haitians were still mired in the living nightmare of industrial slavery, people on the Dominican side were more free to develop technical knowledge and social institutions around "proto-peasant" farming, ranching, and logging activities. Circumstantial linguistic evidence in favor of an east-to-west diffusion of the custom is that the hypothesized transformation of convite into konbit is in keeping with a broader phonological pattern of lexical borrowing, in which the word-final vowel or syllable of the Spanish source term is generally dropped as the word enters the Krey6l lexicon.
15. "La parcela" is found on the audio CD, Grandes Exitos de Antony Santos, Platano Records 5108 (2000).
